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  Entering into the twenty-first century and in particular after the terrorist attacks 
an September 11, 2001, situations urrounding proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction have come to the central stage of international political and security 
challenges. In march 2003, the United States and the United Kingdom started 
bombing an Iraq, the main reason of which was the threatening possession of 
weapons of mass destruction by Iraq. North Korea withdrew form the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in January 2003 and has continuously developed its 
nuclear weapons program. Iran also has been criticized an its clandestinely 
developed uranium enrichment program since August 2002. Finally, Libya agreed 
in December 2003 to stop and dismantle all of its programs an weapons of mass 
destruction. 
  All the four countries mentioned above are/were parties to the NPT and violated 
their safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 
Since the revelation of Iraqi clandestine nuclear weapons program after the 1991 
Gulf War, the IAEA, recognizing the shortcomings of its safeguards system, started 
its effort to strengthen its System. As a result, the Board of Governors of the 
Agency in 1997 adopted a Model Additional Protocol, which purports to secure not 
only of the correctness of declarations but also the completeness of declarations. 
  In order to deal with the issue of non-compliance, Mohamed Elbaradei, Director 
General of the Agency emphasizes the importance of "verification and diplomacy". 
In this paper, first I briefly touch upon the issue of how to maintain and improve 
international peace and security and what is the position of disarmament and non-
proliferation in this regard. Secondly, I analyze the relationship between nuclear 
disarmament and non-proliferation, and then examine the measures to strengthen
* This is a revised and expanded version of a paper "Verification and the Strengthening the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Regime, including Effectively Verifiable NWFZ Treaties," which was 
submitted to the IAEA Seminar for the South Pacific Region an the Conclusion and 
Implementation of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, held in Sydney, Australia an 
November 10 and 11, 2004. . 
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the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the role of nuclear-weapon-free zone 
treaties to complement the regime:, After examining the intin ate relationship 
between verification and disarmament and non-proliferation, finally, 1 emphasize 
the importance of IAEA safeguards agreements and additional protocols for 
international peace and security.
International Peace and Security
  In order to maintain and improve international peace and security, the following 
four elements are at a minimum necessary. The four elements exist in current 
international community, but they are neither strong enough nor effectively 
implemented. They are interdependent each other and the progress in one element 
will promote the progress in the other. All of the four elements must be 
strengthened as much as and as soon as possible in order to create more peaceful 
and secure international community.
No-use of armed forte 
  According to the current rules of international law, the use of armed force is in 
principle prohibited, with two exceptions. The ferst exception is the collective use 
of forte by the United Nations itself, or the use of force by states with the 
authorization by the United Nations Security Council.l1 The second exception is 
the use of force by an individual state for self-defense.2) In practice, states 
sometimes have recourse to armed force even though those conditions are not 
fulfilled. The ferst imperative is to strengthen the norm against he use of armed 
force.
Peaceful settlement of disputes
1) In February 2003, the United States, the United Kingdom and Spain circulated their draft 
   resolution that authorized the use of force by the UN Security Council, but France, Russia, China, 
   Germany and other countries opposed to the draft resolution. As a result, the U.S. and the U.K. 
   decided to attack Iraq without a resolution. 
2) According to the National Security Strategy of the United States of America of September 2002, 
   "The greater the threat
, the greater is the risk of inaction--and the more compelling the rase for 
   taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and 
   place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversariesthe 
   United States will, if necessary, act preemptively." [http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf] 
   However, this statement seems to clearly expand the concept of the traditionally defined right of 
   self-defense, that requires the imminent hreat as an indispensable condition.
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  All disputes must be solved by peaceful means, such as negotiation, mediation, 
good offices, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement. States in dispute 
should at all times search for peaceful means for resolution. As the mechanism for 
solving disputes peacefully is not sufficiently developed or institutionalized in 
international community, it is necessary to develop and institutionalize the 
mechanism for it.3)
Collective security 
  As the norm against the use of armed force is not strong enough and the 
mechanism for peaceful resolution of disputes is not sufficient enough, arbitrary use 
of armed force may happen. In order to deal with such a situation, collective 
security System under the United Nations or a regional organization should be 
adequately established, because current systems are not well functioning. Director 
General of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei states that "As a starting point, we must 
recognize that current crisis of international insecurity will not be resolved by 
anything short of a functional System of collective security, as clearly hoped for in 
the United Nations Charter. The Security Council must be able and ready to engage 
effectively in both preventive diplomacy and enforcement measures, with the tools 
and methods in place necessary to cope with existing and emerging threats to 
international peace and security."4)
Disarmament and non proliferation 
  In order to make the world more safe and peaceful, the limitation, reduction and 
elimination of weapons are indispensable. The practical purpose of disannament 
and non-proliferation is to decrease the chance of weapon's use. The chance of 
using some kind of weapons would be decreased not only by prohibiting their use
3) In the case of Libya, the issue of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction was resolved 
   through the negotiation between Libya and the U.S. and the U.K. which started in March and 
   ended in December 2003. Although the U.S. and U.K. attack an Iraq may give impact an Libya, 
   the desire to come back to international community by Libya appeared in the Tate 1990s as shown 
   in the reparation in Lockerbie case. In the case of North Korea, the six-party talks among North 
   Korea, South Korea, China, the U.S., Russia and Japan sporadically continues, but the prospect is 
   not necessarily clear. Iranian case has been mainly dealt with in the Board of Governors of the 
   IAEA and the U.K., France and Germany are playing a central role for peaceful settlement. 
4) Mohamed ElBaradei, "Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Global Security in a Rapidly Changing 
   World," Keynote Address, Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, Washington, 
   D.C., 21 June 2004. [http://www.ceip.org/files/projeets/npp/resouces/2004conference/speeches/ 
   elbaradei.doc]
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under international law of arms conflicts, but also by limiting, reducing and 
eliminating of their possession by international law of disarmament. However, 
more important and fundamental role of disarmament and non-proliferation is to 
decrease and eliminate not only their military but also political salience or value. 
To establish a world where the rule of law dominates instead of the rule of power, it 
is urgent to decrease the military and political usefulness of weapons.
Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation
  Nuclear weapons, as the most destructive and inhuman weapons, should be 
regulated, limited, reduced, and eventually eliminated in order to promote 
international peace and security. Nuclear disarmament purports to reduce and 
eliminate nuclear weapons, while nuclear non-proliferation aims to prevent further 
proliferation of nuclear weapons. As a result, nuclear non-proliferation must be 
defined as means to the end of nuclear disarmament.5)
The nuclear non proliferation treaty (NPT) and Article VI 
  The main obligation under the NPT is no-receipt and no-production of nuclear 
weapons by non-nuclear-weapon states. The five nuclear-weapon states are 
permitted to possess nuclear weapons under the Treaty as the status quo was 
maintained. That situation seems to be discriminatory. In order to soften the 
discrimination, the NPT includes the obligation to pursue negotiations in good faith 
an nuclear disarmament under Article VI, as well as to cooperate in peaceful uses 
of nuclear energy under Artiele IV. Nuclear non-proliferation obligation is to be 
implemented immediately when it enters into force, while nuclear disarmament 
obligation is to be implemented gradually.6) In order to gauge the progress in
5) According to the UN General Assembly resolution 59/76 of 3 December 2004 that was sponsored 
   by Japan, the General Assembly reaffirms the crucial importance of the Treaty an the Non-
   Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as the cornerstone of the international regime for nuclear 
   non-proliferation and as an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament,and also 
   reaffirms the conviction that further advancement in nuclear disarmament will contribute to 
   consolidating the international regime for nuclear non-proliferation, ensuring international peace 
   and security. 
6) According to UN General Assembly resolution 59/75 of 3 December 2004 sponsored by the New 
   Agenda Coalition, the General Assembly, recalling the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-
   weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear 
   disarmament in accordance with commitments under Article VI of the Treaty an the Non-
   Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, calls upon all states to fully comply with commitmentsmade 
   to nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation.
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nuclear disarmament, a review conference has been held every five years.
1995 NPT review conference-indefinite xtension and principles and objectives 
  The NPT, because of its discriminatory nature, initially provided for the 
duration of twenty-five years. In 1995, twenty-five years after its entry into force, 
the states parties hold a review and extension conference and decided to extend the 
treaty indefinitely. As a package with the extension decision, the conference 
adopted "strengthening the review process for the treaty" and "the principles and 
objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament". Under the latter 
document, they agreed to the completion of the negotiation of a Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) no later than 1996, the immediate 
commencement and early conclusion of the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-
Off Treaty (FMCT), and the determined pursuit of systematic and progressive 
efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally.7
2000 NPT review conference-final document, 13+2 steps 
  The final document adopted by consensus at the2000 NPT review conference 
provides for the following thirteen steps for nuclear disarmament.
1. 
2. 
3. 
4.
5. 
6.
7. 
8. 
9.
importance and urgency to achieve the early entry into force of the CTBT 
a moratorium an nuclear-weapon-test explosions 
necessity of negotiations an a FMCT 
necessity of establishing a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear 
disarmament 
the principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament 
an unequivocal undertaking to accomplish total elimination of nuclear 
weapons 
early entry into force of START II and conclusion of START III 
completion and implementation of Trilateral Initiative 
steps by all the nuclear-weapon states leading to nuclear disarmament 
- further efforts to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally 
- increased transparency 
- further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons
7) For the analysis of this conference, see, Lewis A. Dunn, "High Noon for the NPT," Arms Control 
   Today, Vol.25, No.6, July/August 1995, pp.3-9; John Simpson, "The Birth of a New Era? The 
   1995 NPT Conference and the Politics of Nuclear Disarmament," Security Dialogue, Vol.26, 
   No.3, September 1995, pp.247-256; Mitsuru Kurosawa, "Beyond the 1995 NPT Review 
   Conference: A Japanese View," Osaka University Law Review, No.43, February 1996, pp.l-12.
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      - further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons ystems 
     - a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies
      - engagement ofall the nuclear-weapon states in theprocess 
  10. to place fissile material no longer required for military purposes under 
    IAEA 
  11. the ultimate objective is general and complete disarmament 
  12. regular eport an the implementation ofarticleVI 
  13. further development of the verification capability 
  In addition, the conference calls upon the Preparatory Committee to make 
recommendations an legally binding negative security assurances, and reaffirms the 
conviction that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones enhances global and 
regional peace and security.8)
2005 NPT review conference-Current situation of nuclear disarmament 
  Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty was signed an May 24, 2002 between the 
United States and the Russian Federation. Each party shall reduce and limit 
strategic nuclear warheads, so that by December 31, 2012 the aggregate number of 
such warheads does not exceed 1,700-2,200 for each party. The conclusion of the 
treaty should be praised but their reduction pace is too slow, transparency is not 
ensured, the warheads and delivery systems withdrawn from operational 
deployment are not destroyed but kept for possible redeployment. 
  The CTBT, which was strenuously opposed by the United Sates, has not entered 
into force. The negotiation of a FMCT has not started. The military and political 
salience of nuclear weapons has increased because U.S. nuclear policy based an the 
Nuclear Posture Review of January 20029) and the National Security Strategy of the 
United States of America of September 200210) emphasizes the political and
8) For the analysis of this conference, see, Tariq Rauf, "An Unequivocal Success? Implications of 
   the NPT Review Conference," Arms Control Today, Vol.30, No.6, July/August 2000, pp.9-16; 
   Rebecca Johnson, "The 2000 NPT Review Conference: A Delicate, Hard Won Compromise," 
   Disarmament Diplomacy, No.46, May 2000, pp.2-21; Thomas Graham, Jr., "Surviving the Storm: 
   the NPT after the 2000 Review Conference," Disarmament Diplomacy, No.46, May 2000,pp.22-
   25; Jayantha Dhanapala, "Eliminäting Nuclear Arsenals: the NPT Pledge and What It Means," 
   Disarniament Diplomacy, No.47, July 2000, pp.3-6; Mitsuru Kurosawa, "The 2000 NPT Review 
   Conference and Nuclear Disarmament," Osaka University Law Review, No.48, February 2001, 
   pp.l-38. 
9) Special Briefing an the Nuclear Posture Review, J. D. Crouch, ASD ISP, January 9, 2002 with 
   Slides, [http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2002/tO1092002 tO109npr.html] 
10) http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf
2005] VERIFICATIONAND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGYAGENCY 7
military usefulness of nuclear weapons. It argues for new kinds of nuclear 
weapons, in particular bunker busters and mini-nukes, prepares for the shortening 
of the preparation time for resumption of nuclear test, and proclaims for firnt attack 
to non-nuclear-weapon states with nuclear weapons.
Strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime
  Since the end of the Cold War, a number of measures to strengthen the nuclear 
non-proliferation regime have been taken, because, an the one hand, irresponsible 
states such as Iraq, North Korea, Iran, and Libya tried to develop nuclear weapons 
illegally and clandestinely, and an the other hand, the possibility that terrorist 
groups may steal, obtain, develop or use nuclear weapons has increased since the 
terrorist attacks an September 11, 2001.
Legal measures NWFZs, Additional protocols, CTBT, FMCT, UNSC Res. 1540 
  The NPT is at the Center of the regime and the treaties establishing regional 
nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) are complementary to the NPT. These 
treaties obligate states parties to conclude safeguards agreements with the IAEA, 
which play a fundamental verification function mainly to verify the correctness of 
declaration. Later, in order to detect clandestine nuclear material and activities, a 
model additional protocol was adopted in 1997 to verify the completeness of 
declaration. 
  The CTBT that has not entered into force and a FMCT whose negotiation has 
not started are intended to buttress the non-proliferation regime by involving 
outsiders such as India, Pakistan and Israel in the regime as well as by 
complementing the NPT. In this sense, the entry into force of the CTBT and the 
immediate commencement and early conclusion of the negotiation of a FMCT is 
extremely urgent. 
  United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 adopted unanimously an April 
28, 2004, decides that all states hall adopt and enforce appropriate ffective laws 
which prohibit any non-state actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, 
transport, ransfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, and decides that 
all states hall take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic ontrols to 
prevent he proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.
Technical measures-Export control, Nuclear suppliers group (NSG) 
  The members of the nuclear suppliers group, originally established in 1970s as a
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response to the Indian nuclear test in 1974, agreed an a guideline for export of 
nuclear-related material and technology. In addition, after the revelation of Iraqi 
clandestine nuclear weapons program conducted by using imported ual-use items, 
they agreed an a guideline part 2 in 1992 in order to restrict export of dual-use 
items. Ort the one hand, as these regulations are not legally binding and 
implemented by national laws and regulations of participating states, they 
sometimes lack effective implementation. On the other hand, as these regulations 
are adopted only by industrialized countries and applied to the export o developing 
countries, they are criticized from a viewpoint of legitimacy. 
  Recent revelation of a nuclear black market mainly by A. Q. Khan procurement 
network witnesses the incompleteness and weakness of the current export control 
system. Trading in nuclear materials, equipment and weapons designs was 
conducted and these goods were sold to Iran, Libya and the DPRK.
Cooperative measures-Cooperative threat rduction (CTR), G8 Global 
partnership 
  Since 1991, the United States under Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction 
program has provided funds to shore up nuclear safety and to facilitate weapon 
dismantlement, after facing a dangerous new threat in the sudden collapse of 
Soviet-era controls over its far-flung nuclear infrastructure. 
  In June 2002, at G8 Kananaskis ummit, mainly responding to the danger that 
terrorists are prepared to use any means to cause terror as demonstrated by the 
attacks of September 11, the member states agreed to launch a new G8 Global 
Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. 
They committed to raise up to $20 billion to support he projects over the next ten 
years.
Non-cooperative m asures Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), Iraq war 
  On May 31, 2003, President Bush announced the Proliferation Security 
Initiative (PSI) to prevent the flow of weapons of mass destruction to and from 
states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. At the third meeting of the PSI 
in September 2003, eleven states adopted the statement of interdiction principle. 
The PSI envisions the interdiction of the shipment of weapons of mass destruction, 
by taking actions to board and search any vessel that is reasonably suspected of
transporting such cargoes, and to seize such cargoes. 
  Iraq war in 2003 is the implementation of non-proliferation measures by force, 
based an counter-proliferation p licy of the United States and the United Kingdom
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using military means. Main cause of initiating an armed attack was the threat of 
possessing and possible using weapons of mass destruction by Iraq. However, later 
it became clear that Iraq did not possess any weapons of mass destruction.ll)
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones
  Nuclear-weapon-free zones established by the initiative of regional states 
contribute to the efforts of non-proliferation, build confidence and trust among the 
participating states, and help improve regional and international peace and security. 
The efforts to establish NWFZs worldwide should be encouraged.
Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba, Mongolia 
  Treaty of Tlatelolco for Latin America and the Caribbean was signed in 1967 
and entered into force in 1968, Treaty of Rarotonga for the South Pacific was 
signed in 1985 and entered into force in 1986, Treaty of Bangkok for South East 
Asia was signed in 1995 and entered into force in 1997, and Treaty of Pelindaba for 
Africa was signed in 1996 but not yet entered into force. As a result, almost all part 
of Southem Hemisphere is now covered by the NWFZs. 
  Mongolia is recognized as a nuclear-weapon-free status by the United Nations 
General Assembly resolution in 1998.
Middle East, South Asia 
  Since 1994, the initiative to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle 
East and South Asia has been pursued, mainly by adopting UN General Assembly 
resolutions. However, there has been no progress in either region. Israel is 
believed to have around two hundreds nuclear weapons though Israel never declares 
itself as a nuclear-possessing state. India and Pakistan conducted nuclear 
explosions in 1998 and continue development and deployment of nuclear weapons.
11) Ort this point, the Director General of the IAEA, Dr. Mohamed ElBaladei sharply criticized the 
   United States by saying, "Our recent experience in verifying undeclared nuclear programmeshas 
   yielded a number of important lessons, which are worth noting here. Perhaps the most important 
   lesson is that verification and diplomacy, used in conjunction, can be effective. When inspections 
  are accompanied by adequate authority, aided by all available information, backed bya credible 
   compliance mechanism, and supported by international consensus, the System works. The Iraq 
   experience has demonstrated that inspections - while requiring time and patience - can be 
   effective even when the country under inspection is providing less than active cooperation." 
  (Statement to the Forty-eighth Regular Session of the IAEA General Conference, 20 September 
  2004 [http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2004/ebsp2004n008.html])
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Central Asia, North East Asia, Central and Eastern Europe 
  A Central Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone has been negotiated sirice the summit 
meeting and the meeting of foreign ministers in 1997 among Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Negotiations continued and in 
September 2002, the five countries agreed to sign a treaty. 
  There has been no formal negotiation an establishing a nuclear-weapon-free 
zone in North East Asia yet, though there are some discussions and proposals 
among academics and experts. Once North Korean nuclear issue is resolved, 
negotiations for that purpose should be started. Central and Eastern Europe, where 
once there were many nuclear weapons deployed and withdrawn with the end of the 
Cold War, now represents a de facto nuclear-weapon-free zone.
NWFZs-non Proliferation, no-stationing, negative security assurances 
  Merit or virtue of nuclear-weapon-free zones is far superior to nuclear non-
proliferation. Because the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones includes not only 
the concept of nuclear non-proliferation, that is, no-receipt and no-production of 
nuclear weapons, but also no-stationing of nuclear weapons owned by nuclear-
weapon states. It represents the total absence of nuclear weapons in the region. In 
addition, the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones includes the provision of legally 
binding negative security assurances to the member states of the zone by nuclear-
weapon states. 
  Based an such a legal structure, establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones 
would promotes peace and security of member states as well as the regional peace 
and security.
Verification and Disarmament and Non-Proliferation
  To verify is to make sure or demonstrate that something is true, accurate, or 
justified. Every undertaking or promise needs to be verified to some degree, but an 
agreement an disarmament and non-proliferation which deeply affects the national 
security of states parties necessarily requires verification.
Verification is an indispensable lement of disarmament and non proliferation12
12) However, the current Bush administration takes a quite different position. In the case of Strategie 
  Offensive Reduction Treaty (Moscow Treaty) of 2002, which codified the unilaterally planned 
   reduction of operationally depolyed strategic nuclear warheads by the United States, it contains 
   no provision an verification, in sharp contrast with previous SALT and START treaties. The
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  The process 1 of ,treaty negotiation an disarmament and non-proliferation is 
simultaneously the -process of verification negotiation. As treaties of disarmament 
and non-proliferation ' deeply affect party's national security and interest, 
historically the scope of measures for disarmament and non-proliferation has been 
decided by the availability or acceptability of verification measures for it. 
Disarmament and non-proliferation measures that can not be verified can not be 
agreed upon as treaty provisions. For example, Partial Test Ban Treaty does not 
prohibit underground nuclear tests, because the United States and the Soviet Union 
could not agree an on-site inspection. The SALT Treaty and the START Treaty 
limit the number of delivery systems in stead of warheads, because it was 
impossible to verify the number of warheads.
National technical means of verification and on-site inspection 
  Generally speaking there are two kinds of verification: one is national technical 
means of verification that are conducted individually by each party without coming 
close to the place of concern or without cooperation of other parties, and the other 
is on-site inspection that is conducted at the place of concern an mutual bäse or by 
international or regional organizations. 
  During the Cold War era, verification under the treaties between the United 
States and the Soviet Union/the Russian Federation exclusively depends an national 
technical means, that is, through satellite surveillance. However, after the Tate 
1980s, they include several kinds of on-site inspections. The Partial Test Ban 
Treaty of 1963 depends an national technical means of verification, but the 
Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty of 1996 has established international monitoring 
System including challenge on-site inspection. 
  Verification activities conducted by the IAEA for non-proliferation are mainly 
on-site inspections. The basic verification method used by the IAEA is nuclear 
material accountancy with containment and surveillance as important 
complementary measures. Complementary access is authorized under the 
additional protocol.
Purposes-Confirmation, deterrence, early detection, confidence-building 
  The main and principal purpose of verification is to confirm and provide
draft verification protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention that was negotiated for several 
years was destroyed by the rejected by one country, that is, the United States in 2001. In 
addition, the U.S. agreed to statt negotiations an a FMCT in 2004, but strongly argued against a 
treaty with verification provisions.
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assurance that parties are in compliance with treaty obligations. Mutual 
confirmation in the case of bilateral treaties, and organizational confirmation in the 
case of multilateral treaties are indispensable for the treaties to survive. If the 
verification is strong enough, it would deter a possible violator because of high 
probability of detection. The second purpose is deterrence from a possible 
violation. It is necessary to detect as early as possible for the integration of the 
treaty or for the security of other parties. The third purpose is an early detection of 
a possible violation. If there is a material breach of treaty obligations, the integrity 
of the treaty would be lost. The fundamental purpose of verification is to build 
confidence among states parties by confirming and giving assurance to their 
compliance with the treaty obligations.
IAEA Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols
  IAEA safeguards agreements and additional protocols play an extremely 
important role of verification in the sphere of nuclear non-proliferation.
Article III of the NPT and Provision under NWFZ Treaties 
  According to Article III of the NPT, each non-nuclear-weapon state undertakes 
to accept safeguards and shall conclude agreements with the IAEA. Negotiation of 
such agreements shall commence not later than the date of the deposit and shall 
enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of 
negotiations. Article 13 of the Tlatelolco Treaty, Article 8 of the Rarotonga Treaty, 
Article 5 of the Bangkok Treaty and Article 9 of the Pelindaba Treaty provide for 
the Same requirement. It is a legal obligation for the parties to these treaties to 
conclude safeguards agreements with the IAEA within the fixed time. Otherwise, it 
is tantamount to non-compliance with the treaty obligations. 
  Under this safeguards agreement, states parties provide precise declarations an 
nuclear material and facilities, and the IAEA conducts inspections of nuclear 
material and verification of design information. This is qualitative verification and 
conclusion is an the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities. 
  In the case of the NPT, a state that has not concluded a safeguards agreement is
not entitled to demand nuclear disarmament to nuclear-weapon states. In the case 
of the NWFZ Treaties, a state that has not concluded a safeguards agreement isnot 
entitled to demand the signature and ratification of protocols including negative 
security assurances to nuclear-weapon states.
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Additional protocols and integrated safeguards 
  Under the additional protocol, states parties provide descriptive declarations an 
relevant materials and activities, and the IAEA conducts complementary access to 
relevant locations. This is qualitative valuation and conclusion is an the absence 
of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a state, so that non-proliferation 
obligation is more completely confirmed. 
  Conclusion of the additional protocol is not a legally binding obligation under 
the NPT, contrary to the case of a comprehensive safeguards agreement. It is a new 
undertaking voluntarily accepted by each party. However, there are strong 
recommendations to conclude an additional protocol by the 2000 NPT review 
conference, the UN General Assembly, and the IAEA General Conference. There 
is also a tendency to make the conclusion of the additional protocol as a condition 
for providing nuclear-related items and technology. The conclusion of the 
additional protocol is highly recommended from the viewpoint of transparency and 
confidence-building. 13) 
  When the absence of clandestine nuclear material and activities in a state is 
confirmed by the IAEA, integrated safeguards are applied to the state. The 
integrated safeguards refer to the Optimum combination of all safeguards measures 
available to the Agency under comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional 
protocols, which achieves maximum effectiveness and efficiency.
Transparency, confidence-building, peace and security 
  The verification system through comprehensive safeguards agreements and 
additional protocols, or integrated safeguards is indispensable to confirm the 
absence of non-compliance with the obligations under the NPT and the NWFZ 
Treaties. In order to make the verification system effectively function, states 
parties must submit enough information, and allow the Agency access to related 
information or facilities. The first element for the verification is the need of 
transparency.
13) The importance of the additional protocol is emphasized by the Director-General, Mohamed 
   Elbaradei by saying, "First, it should by now be obvious that the additional protocol is asine qua 
  non for effective verification. Without an additional protocol in force, the IAEA has little 
   prospect of uncovering the increasingly sophisticated clandestine nuclear weapons programmes. I 
  believe that, for the Agency to be able to fulfil its verification responsibilities in a credible 
   manner, the additional protocol must become the standard for all countries that are party to the 
   Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)." (Introductory Statement o the Board of Governors, 8 
  March 2004. [http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2004/ebsp2004n002.html])
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  Based an the transparency, the Agency can confirm,-that a state abides by the 
treaty obligations and there is na suspect of clandestine activities relating to nuclear 
weapons. The confirmation and assurance by the international organization, the 
International Atomic Energy Agency will build confidence among states in a 
region. The second element for the verification is the confidence-building. 
  Among the states with confidence and trust each other, any dispute would be 
resolved by peaceful means without having recourse to armed forces. This pattern 
of behavior is a base for international peace and security. The verification System 
under the Agency is one of the very important measures for maintaining and 
improving international peace and security.
